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 In this paper, we investigate the attitudes of institutional investors, such as hedge funds, 
insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds, towards a key corporate governance 
mechanism, namely executive compensation. The purpose of this study is to document the 
preferences they have about both the level and structure of executive compensation. Our analysis 
takes a comparative approach as we ask investors to reveal their preferences both for firms in the 
US and in The Netherlands. Our analysis further shed  light on who should decide on executive 
pay, thereby contributing to the recent debate on shareholder involvement in executive pay.  
Finally, we examine their views on the most important nd largest component of executive pay, 
executive stock options, and investigate what preferences they have when it comes to the design 






Over the last two decades, institutional investing has become an important component of 
financial markets (e.g., Gillan and Starks (2007)). The increase in institutional ownership has 
been accompanied by an enhanced role played by institutions in monitoring the corporate 
governance behavior of companies. Among other things, i stitutional investors ascertain whether 
companies comply with the best practice standards elaborated in the guidelines established by 
corporate governance bodies, pursue proxy voting challenges at annual meetings or conduct 
coordinated shareholder activism. 
Prior research has studied the participation of institutional investors in targeting poorly 
performing firms and pressuring boards of directors  improve corporate performance. In recent 
years, activist institutions in the United States (US) have made use of a federally-mandated 
privilege to submit shareholder proposals included in the management’s annual proxy statement 
for a vote at the annual general meeting (see Cotter and Thomas (2007)). The proposal process 
provides a mechanism for shareholders to raise corporate governance and performance concerns 
and to pressure boards to implement the proposed changes. Most proposals submitted by 
investors (other than hedge funds) relate to the elimination of anti-takeover devices, executive 
compensation, the board of directors and voting rules. In the last decade, hedge funds have 
embraced activist strategies, taking investment stake  in underperforming firms and directly 
engaging management to undertake changes that are favorable for outside shareholders and their 
financial agenda (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008)).  
The evolving role of institutional investor participation in corporate governance is likely 
to continue and its growth is driven by investor strategies which have changed significantly. In 
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this chapter, we investigate the attitudes of institutional investors, such as hedge funds, insurance 
companies, mutual funds and pension funds, towards a key corporate governance mechanism, 
namely executive compensation. The purpose of this s udy is to document the preferences they 
have about both the level and structure of executive compensation. Our analysis takes a 
comparative approach as we ask investors to reveal th ir preferences both for firms in the US and 
in The Netherlands. Further, we selected these two countries because they have different legal 
origins, investor protection regimes, and ownership c aracteristics. In particular, the United 
States is an English common law country that is generally considered to have high investor 
protection, low ownership concentration, and high institutional ownership, whereas The 
Netherlands is a French civil law country that is viewed as having low investor protection, high 
ownership concentration, and low institutional ownership.  
Our analysis further sheds light on who should deci on executive pay, thereby 
contributing to the recent debate on shareholder involvement in executive pay (“say on pay”). 
Finally, we study their views on the most important d largest component of executive pay, 
executive stock options, and investigate what preferences they have when it comes to the design 
of such options. To investigate these issues, we make use of a new dataset from a survey of 118 
large institutional investors, including mutual funds, hedge funds or insurance firms. 
Based on our survey responses, we find that a majority of investors prefer a reduction of 
the level of severance payments (golden handshakes) when CEOs leave, both for portfolio firms 
in The Netherlands and the US. This is consistent with the view that the granting of extravagant 
pay packages reflects poor corporate governance and a strong CEO bargaining position. 
Interestingly, the majority of investors do not think that overall CEO pay should be reduced in 
The Netherlands. Moreover, a (small) majority believes that the compensation of Dutch CEOs 
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should be more equity-based (i.e. more stock options or restricted shares). While overall CEO 
pay in The Netherlands is generally not considered as being too high, almost half of the investors 
believe that CEO pay in the US should be reduced. 
Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posits that shareholders should make the 
pay decision in order to limit the moral hazard problem caused by low ownership stakes of CEOs 
and to provide incentives to motivate CEOs to maximize shareholder wealth. Our analysis 
reveals that shareholders prefer to be responsible deciding about the structure and level of CEO 
pay. We find, moreover, no evidence that the differences in the one-tier versus two-tier board 
system have an effect on shareholder preferences for CEO pay decisions being delegated to the 
compensation committee (one tier system) or non-executive members of the board (two tier 
system).  
Insofar as institutional investors’ preferences for the design of executive stock options, 
we find that investors are sensitive to a transparent disclosure of option compensation, relative 
operating and stock price benchmarks (benchmarks that managers need to fulfill before they are 
eligible to exercise their options) and long vesting periods. In addition, absolute stock price 
benchmarks are considered relatively unimportant, which is consistent with optimal contracting 
models (Holmstrom (1979, 1982)). 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a review of 
selected evidence on the role of institutional investors in executive compensation. Section III 
contains the data sources and summary information ab ut the investors in the sample. Section IV 
presents the empirical results of our study on the preferences of institutional investors regarding 




2. Institutional investors and executive compensation  
 
Previous research has shown that institutional investors can influence the structure and level 
of executive compensation. We consider two possible views on the role of institutional investors 
on executive compensation. 
The first view arises from agency theory research and highlights the monitoring benefits of 
institutional investors, i.e. their role in ensuring that CEO pay is properly designed. This view 
implies, for example, that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO pay, a measure of how 
well incentives of CEOs and shareholders are aligned, should be positively related to the 
concentration of institutional investor ownership (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Providing support 
for this standpoint, the empirical work by Hartzell and Starks (2003) shows that with an increase 
in institutional investor ownership, CEO pay levels decrease but pay-for-performance 
sensitivities increase.   
A second view highlights potential conflicts of interests arising from business ties between 
institutional investors and CEOs of their portfolio firms. This perspective suggests that 
institutional investors with more conflicts of interests from business ties are less likely to 
contribute to the monitoring of CEO pay (Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988)). Moreover, this 
work suggests important differences between pressur-resistant institutional investors, who have 
greater incentives to influence the level of CEO pay, and pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors, who because they must continue to maintain their business relationships are unlikely to 
invest in active monitoring. Recent research finds evidence in support of the role that different 
groups of institutional investors play in influencig total CEO pay. For example, Shin and Seo 
(2010) show the different effect of public pension fu ds and mutual funds on the level of CEO 
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pay and pay-for-performance sensitivity for CEO, thus observing a negative association of 
pension fund ownership with CEO pay and a positive association for mutual fund ownership and 
total CEO pay.  
Institutional investors not only influence executive compensation directly, but also indirectly 
through their trading. Trading may affect executive pay through its effect on the value of the 
option and stock holdings of executives. Recent evidence demonstrates the important role of 
trading behavior of investors. Sias, Starks and Titman (2002) show that stock returns are 
correlated with changes in institutional ownership, which is due to the informed trading of 
institutional investors. The enforcement of insider trading rules creates dangers for institutional 
investors which can reduce this effect (Maug 2002). 
In response to the above-stated views, a new line of r search has integrated the implicit 
assumption that institutional investors are heterogneous in their effects on CEO compensation 
structure and looks to their preferences to explain the different pay outcomes for CEOs. For 
example, Bushee and Noe (2000) show that improved disclosure rankings increases the 
attractiveness to transient institutional investors who are more likely to act as traders, which can 
greatly influence the share price of the portfolio company. In contrast with institutions with a 
longer investment horizon and concentrated holdings (dedicated investors) who invest in 
monitoring and attempt to introduce changes in the s rategies of portfolio firms, transient 
investors are more likely to sell the firms’ shares in reaction to poor firm performance or to force 
CEO turnover. This increases the willingness of portfolio companies to adopt CEO pay packages 
that transient investors’ prefer in order to ensure that investors maintain their holdings in the 
company’s stock.  




We exploit in this study a new dataset from a survey of institutional investors to better 
understand the preferences of institutional investors about CEO compensation. We use our 
survey to assess their views about three important aspects of executive pay, namely (i) whether 
adjustments to the level and structure of pay are nec ssary, (ii) who should decide on pay, and 
(iii) how executive stock option plans should be designed.  
The survey questions were developed based on the existing executive pay literature. Before 
conducting the survey, we circulated it among academics and investor relations research experts 
to get their feedback and suggestions on the survey design and execution. Our survey recipients 
were selected from the FactSet/LionShares database, which defines institutional investors as 
professional money managers with discretionary control over assets. Because we ask our survey 
respondents to assess executive pay in the United States and The Netherlands, we need to ensure 
that they have at least some knowledge of CEO pay in The Netherlands. Consequently, we 
restrict the survey to those institutions in the datab se that have at least 5% of their assets under 
management invested in Dutch companies. Asking questions about pay in The Netherlands and 
the US allows us to benchmark and compare the situation in both countries. The scope of our 
survey includes all important investor-types, i.e. p nsion funds, mutual funds, insurance 
companies and hedge funds. 
Our survey was sent by email to the chief investmen officers of a total of 1,178 institutional 
investors on November 1, 2007. To maximize the respon e rate additional reminders were sent 
and individual phone calls made in the last weeks of December 2007 and the last responses were 
received in the first weeks of January 2008. We recived a total of 118 surveys, resulting in a 
response rate of about 10%. We are able to match the identity of the institutional investors and 
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hence the survey responses with data from FactSet/LionShares on institutional investor 
characteristics such as assets under management or share turnover for 90 of these 118 investors.  
The original survey also contained a wide set of question on the preferences of institutional 
investors for country-level investor protection, firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, and 
shareholder activism. An extensive analysis of these questions is provided in McCahery, Sautner 
and Starks (2011). 
Table 1 shows in Panel A that the average institutional investor in our sample has about 
623m USD assets under management. The largest 5% ofinvestor in our sample have invested 
assets worth more than 3.5bn USD. The average investor further has an annual share turnover of 
16% and holds 89 firms in its portfolio. The fraction of assets invested by the investors in The 
Netherlands and the US is approximately 10% and 9%, respectively.   
 
[Table I about here] 
 
Panel B reports the breakdown of the investors by type of institution. As can be seen, by 
far the most institutions in the sample are mutual f nds (63%), but our sample also includes 
hedge funds, insurance firms and pension funds. Panel C shows that our respondents come from 
a wide range of countries, but a majority comes from The Netherlands and other European 
countries.  
In the survey, we also asked the investors to what extent they make use of proxy voting 
advisors such as ISS or Glass Lewis for voting at an annual meeting. We included this question 
to examine to what extent investors delegate their vot ng decisions, for example on potential 
executive pay issues, to external advisors. The data, reported in Panel D of Table I, suggests that 
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over half of the institutions in our sample do not employ proxy voting advisory services at all. Of 
those investors that use proxy voting firms to some ext nt, most use the advice of these firms to 
determine their own position vis-à-vis the portfolio company of interest. Overall, this suggests 
that our investors show substantial levels of involvement when it comes to issues such as 
executive pay. More detailed characteristics about the investors can be found in McCahery, 
Sautner and Starks (2011). 
 
4. Executive compensation preferences 
 
Having supplied a general description of the characte istics of the investors in our sample, 
we will provide, in the next section, an analysis of their preferences with regard to different 
aspects of executive compensation.  
 
4.1. The structure and level of executive compensation 
The rise of executive compensation is partially the result of a perceived need to bring 
about change in corporate performance and to establish a ink between the pay and wealth of 
executives and shareholder value (Hall and Liebman (1998)). Much research has documented a 
strong correlation between pay and corporate size, typically measured by reference to sales 
(Murphy (1999)). Top executive pay levels vary not only by corporate size, but also differ 
substantially according to industrial sector, performance and a firm’s growth opportunities. Pay-
to-sales sensitivities are much higher in manufacturing industries than in financial services and 
utilities, a phenomenon which is similar across countries. 
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There is evidence of increasing convergence of top executive pay levels and of 
remuneration structures resulting from the emergence of an international market for top 
managers, the abolition of legal prohibitions on executive stock options, and the use of peer 
groups to determine competitive levels of compensation. However, comparative research shows 
that the total level of CEO pay in the US is roughly double than that in any other country, even 
allowing for differences in purchasing power and taxa ion of direct pay and perquisites 
(Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2010)). Interestingly, this substantial discrepancy 
between the United States and all other countries is only observed at the level of the CEO and 
does not extend down to lower-level management. Notice also that executive pay in the US 
significantly outpaces the pay practices of The Netherlands.  
A number of explanations have been offered for the dramatic rise in CEO compensation 
in the US compared to other countries. First, contrasting compensation levels may reflect the 
difference in firm size between the US, and other OECD countries. Second, the high level of 
executive pay may be due partly to the substantial gap in stock market performance across the 
1990s. Nevertheless, even if stock options are taken into account, the differences in 
compensation practices between Europe and the US are still substantial. Third, the divergence in 
practice may be due to the degree of influence the CEO has over the board of directors (Bebchuk 
and Fried 2003). Finally, the difference may also be due to the risk premium that needs to be 
paid if firms predominantly pay their managers using stock options, as it is practice in most large 
US firms (Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2010)).  
In light of the general increases in executive pay and the substantial differences that 
arguably exists between CEO pay in US and Dutch firms, Figures I a-b present information 
about whether institutional investors deem adjustmen  in the level and structure of CEO 
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compensation in the US and The Netherlands necessary. We seek to elicit their preferences on 
the level of pay by asking, separately for the US and The Netherlands, whether they think that 
CEO pay is too high or too low, whether reduction in severance pay are considered necessary, 
and by asking whether they have a preference for caps on the overall level of CEO compensation. 
Similarly, we attempted to measure their preferences on the structure of pay by asking whether 
the think that CEOs should be more or less compensat d with equity-based pay.  
Turning to the Netherlands, we find that a majority, 55%, of investors prefer a reduction 
of the level of severance payments (golden handshakes) when CEOs leave. Interestingly, the 
majority of investors do not think that overall CEO pay should be reduced in The Netherlands. 
Moreover, a (small) majority believes that the compensation of Dutch CEOs should be more 
equity-based (i.e. more stock options or restricted shares). We will discuss the preferences of 
investors with regard to the design of equity-based pay, in particular stock options, below.  
 
[Figures I a-b about here] 
 
For the US, we find that respondents have a similar v ew with regard to reducing the 
level of severance pay, with 57% of the respondents being in favor of reducing the levels of 
severance packages. Interestingly, while overall CEO pay in The Netherlands is generally not 
considered as being too high, 46% of the investors believe that CEO pay in the US should be 
reduced.  
Overall, the data indicate that a large number of investors are dissatisfied with the overall 
level of executive compensation in the US but not so much in The Netherlands. This result is in 
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line with the above mentioned differences in the observed levels of CEO pay in The Netherlands 
and in the US. 
 
4.2. Decision making around executive compensation 
 
Public discontent over pay packages of top executives in the US and Europe has triggered 
a debate in politics, academia, and the public at large on whether shareholders should have more 
influence on the pay setting process (“say on pay”). Providing support for this view, it is 
noteworthy that recent empirical research suggests tha  shareholder voting indeed can serve as a 
check against greater compensation for managers, but mainly in poorly governed firms (Cai and 
Walking (2011)). Based on this evidence, we expect that institutional investors would have a 
preference for deciding themselves on the design and volume of executive compensation 
packages in their portfolio firms. 
 
[Figures II a-b about here] 
 
To contribute to this debate, Figures II a-b reports views about whether investors 
preferred having shareholders decide over executives’ remuneration at the annual general 
meeting (AGM). We report their responses separately for firms with a one-tier or two-tier board 
system, to determine whether their preferences may be related to the board system in place. Note 
that in the one-tier board system, a firm has one board of directors consisting of both executive 
and non-executive directors (as in the United States). With a two-tier board system, a firm has 
two separate boards, namely, a management board, which is responsible for the day-to-day 
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management of the firm, and a supervisory board, which monitors the management board (as in 
Germany). Dutch firms have a choice between the two board structures.  
We find that most respondents (in terms of the no votes) are opposed to giving 
management power over executive compensation (96% in case a firm has a one-tier and 97% in 
case a firm has a two-tier board). Similarly, we find negative associations with delegating pay 
decisions to non-executive board members (80%) or members of a supervisory board (73%) in 
case of a two-tier system. Furthermore, the majority f institutional investors are not inclined to 
entrust board committees to deciding on executive pay. However, the data indicate a majority 
response to the suggestion of allocating shareholders with decision-making authority over 
executive compensation, both in the one-tier and in the two-tier system.  
Overall, these figures give strong support to our hypothesis that institutional investors 
prefer to have the decision-making power over executive pay in their own hands at the annual 
general meeting. 
 
4.3. Designing executive stock options 
 
Executive stock options constitute the largest compnent of CEO pay. At the same time, 
they are probably also the most difficult component of executive pay when it comes to their 
design, as poorly designed option plans can trigger dysfunctional managerial behavior such as 
excessive risk taking. It is therefore crucial to understand the views of institutional investors on 
how such option plans should be designed. Industry codes of good practice typically endorse the 
adoption of disclosure of option characteristics and the volumes granted, long vesting periods, 
relative performance benchmarks, and subjecting pay schemes to shareholder approval.  
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In order to understand the option design preferences of institutional investors, we used 
our survey to ask them to assess the importance of a set of key design features incorporated in 
option plans, namely (1) relative stock performance benchmarks; (2) relative operating 
performance benchmarks; (3) absolute stock market performance benchmarks; (4) absolute 
operating performance benchmarks; (5) exercise prics that are in the money; (6) exercise prices 
that are out of the money; (7) long vesting periods; (8) long time to maturities; and (9) disclosure 
of option characteristics. The investors could indicate on a scale from 1 (not important at all) to 7 
(very important) how they assess these different design features.  
[Insert Figure III about here] 
 
The results, reported in Figure III, are consistent with the features of good governance 
codes. In particular, investors consider sufficient disclosure, long vesting periods, and relative 
operating and stock performance benchmarks as key design features of properly designed option 
plans. We find less evidence in favor of linking compensation to absolute stock performance 
benchmarks, which is in line with the suggestions of optimal contracting models (e.g., 
Holmstrom (1979, 1982)). Interestingly, Figure III reveals that there is little difference between 
the weight given to disclosure and the absolute stock performance benchmarks in the vesting 
conditions. Finally, we find that institutional investors apparently do not find options that are 
designed with exercise prices in the money very important (such options could be used as a way 






In this chapter, we analyzed a new dataset that is con tructed based on a survey among 
118 institutional investors and that elicits their preferences about various aspects of executive 
compensation. In particular, we used our survey to understand their views about (i) whether 
adjustments to the level and structure of executive compensation are necessary, (ii) who should 
decide on executive pay, and (iii) how executive stock options should be designed. 
We show that a majority of investors want to reduce the size of firm’s severance 
packages to departing CEOs. Furthermore, the majority of nvestors do not think that overall 
CEO pay should be reduced in The Netherlands. Moreover, a (small) majority believes that the 
compensation of Dutch CEOs should be more equity-based. While overall CEO pay in The 
Netherlands is generally not considered as being too high, almost 50% of institutional investors 
believe that CEO pay in the US should be reduced. 
Our study also reveals that shareholders prefer to be responsible for the design and 
volume of executive pay. We find no evidence that te differences in the one-tier versus two-tier 
board system will have an any effect on shareholder preferences for CEO pay decisions being 
delegated to the compensation committee in a one tier system, or non-executive members of the 
board in a two tier system. Finally, our study recognizes the differences in investor’s preferences 
in the design of executive stock options. In terms of the order of importance, we show that 
institutional investors prefer disclosure of option compensation, relative operating and stock 
price benchmarks that managers need to fulfill before they are eligible to exercise their options, 
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Table I: Institutional Investor Characteristics 
 
Panel A of this table summarizes descriptive statistics of the main characteristics of the institutional investors that returned our questionnaires (total f 118 
responses). It contains information on the assets under management of the investors (value of equity portfolio measured in 1000 USD), on the fraction of shares 
which are invested in firms listed in The Netherlands (in %) as well as in the U.S. (in %), and on the s are turnover of the investors. The share turnover is 
measured as the value of all buy and sell transactions n a quarter divided by the market value of the equity portfolio. The data source for these investor 
characteristics is FactSet/LionShares. The number of observations varies and is smaller than 118 due to limited data availability in FactSet/LionShares. Panel A 
further reports data on the size of the equity stakes (in %) that the institutional investors hold in their portfolio firms and reports the market values (in 1000 USD) 
of these stakes. This data is also from FactSet/LionShares. Panel B shows the distribution of the 118 survey respondents by investor-type. The investor-type 
categorization is based on self-reported information in the returned questionnaires. Panel C reports the national origins of the investors (actual seat and not legal 
seat). This information is hand-collected. Panel D records whether and to what extent the institutional investors make use of external proxy voting advisors when 
determining how to vote in a Dutch annual meeting (AGM). Conditional on using such firms (i.e. if the answer is not ‘Never’), the panel also contains 
information on the extent to which the advice of the proxy voting firms is used. The data source for this information is also the returned questionnaires. The 
FactSet/LionShares variables are calculated for the year-end 2007. 
 
Panel A: Institutional Investor Characteristics           
             
Investor Characteristic Mean Median STD 5% 95% Obs.       
             
Assets under Management (in 1000 USD) 623,000 140,000 1,260,000 9,540 3,550,000 90       
Fraction of Assets invested in NL (in %) 10.38% 6.85% 13.96% 0.00% 33.38% 90       
Fraction of Assets invested in US (in %) 9.21% 0.00% 18.93% 0.00% 48.23% 90       
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Share Turnover 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.32 87       
Number of Firms in Portfolio 89 60 135 20 292 89       
             
Ownership Position in Portfolio Firms  Mean Median STD 5% 95% Obs.       
             
Percentage Ownership Stake (in %) 0.131 0.006 0.573 0.000 0.534 7919       
Value of Ownership Stake (in 1000 USD) 6,103 841 20,10  44 29,400 7919       
             
Panel B: Type of Institution             
 All Investors Hedge Fund Insurance Mutual Fund Pension Fund Other Investors 
  Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number P rcent Number Percent Number Percent 
             
Questionnaire Responses 118 100.0% 7 5.9% 9 7.6% 74 62.7% 7 5.9% 21 17.8% 




Panel C: Investor Origin (Actual Seat)             
 All Investors Hedge Fund Insurance Mutual Fund Pension Fund Other Investors 
  Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
The Netherlands  12 13% 2 50% 0 0% 7 11% 1 33% 2 14% 
UK 12 13% 0 0% 1 14% 7 11% 1 33% 3 21% 
Germany 8 9% 0 0% 1 14% 7 11% 0 0% 0 0% 
France  9 10% 0 0% 2 29% 5 8% 0 0% 2 14% 
Luxembourg 3 3% 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 2 14% 
Other European Countries ** 33 37% 1 25% 3 43% 26 42% 0 0% 3 21% 
US 9 10% 0 0% 0 0% 6 10% 1 33% 2 14% 
Other North American (Canada, Caymans) 4 4% 1 25% 0 0% 3 5% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 90 100% 4 100% 7 100% 62 100% 3 100% 14 100% 
**Note: Each European country in this category (BE, CH, NO, IE, IT, FI, ES) has five or less investors in the sample  
             
Panel D: Importance of Proxy Voting Advisors            
             
Usage of Proxy Voting Advisors  Always That depends on 
the company 
That depends on 
the agenda item 
That depends on 
the circumstances 
Never Sum Obs. 
             
Percent of Responses 17% 10% 7% 13% 53% 100% 118 
             
Manner of Usage of Proxy Voting Advice  Always follow 
advice fully 
Use advice to 
determine own 
position 
Use advice in case 
of own doubts 
Others     Sum Obs. 
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Figure I a-b: The structure and level of executive compensation 
This figure reports the views of institutional investors about the structure and level of executive compensation in the 
US and The Netherlands. The data source for this information is the returned questionnaires. 
 
Assessment of Executive Compensation in the US:





























































































Figure II a-b: Decision making around executive compensation  
This figure reports the views of institutional investors about the decision making around executive compensation. 
The data source for this information is the returned questionnaires. 
  
Decision Making around Executive Compensation: 






























Decision Making around Executive Compensation: 

































Figure III: Designing executive stock options 
This figure reports the views of institutional investors about the design of executive stock option plans. The data 
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Mean Response (1=Not Important at All, 7=Very Important)
Importance of Executive Stock Option Design Features
